But this means abstract objects aren't necessary beings, which seems obviously false. On classical theism, anything other than God is created by God. If revelation showed that God was a quaternity of persons, then we would have to accept that on faith, and the same types of arguments we use to show that a Trinity of persons is not contradictory to a oneness of essence would apply. That is as far as we can take it or want to take it. What Christians do when they argue for the Trinity is to show that it is not contrary to reason to affirm a trinity of persons in one substance or essence. You can attack this dotrine to attempt to disprove Christianity, which is fine, but even if you succeeded, you would not disprove the existence of God. But why can't one being be a trinitarian being and the other a binatarian being? The classical theist has to show why a being whose essence is identical to existence can only be trinitarian." Aquinas’s De Ente argument argues that there can't be two beings whose essence is identical to its existence since there would be nothing to differentiate the two. Extrinsic models of divine knowing don't work here since, before creation, there is nothing extrinsic to God. If so, then God has contingent knowledge in this world, which goes against his being purely actual. In such a world, God knows that I don't exist. God could have refrained from creating anything. If we say that abstract objects are divine ideas, this also seems implausible, for given divine simplicity, every divine idea would be identical to every divine idea, and so the number one would be identical to the number seven, which is false.ģ.
But why can't one being be a trinitarian being and the other a binatarian being? The classical theist has to show why a being whose essence is identical to existence can only be trinitarian.Ģ. Here are 3 objections from him that I find strong, let me know what you think.ġ.
0 kommentar(er)
